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Abstract
A new branch of the literature on international trade and environment suggests
that developing countries are becoming waste havens for their developed counterparts,
due to environmental regulation differences with trade partners. This paper analyses
the effectiveness of the Basel Convention formalisation in the European Union (EU-
WSR), by studying the impact of the EU-WSR on hazardous waste trade, first on the
less developed EU countries, and then on regions of developing countries. It does so,
by means of a gravity model framework applied to a panel data-set. Results show that
there is no enough evidence to call for waste haven effect in the less developed EU
countries, with both aggregated and disaggregated measures of environmental regula-
tions, but increasing institution efficiency differences could lead to increasing imports
of waste. In the regional analysis, there is no evidence of the efficacy of the EU-WSR.
These findings provide insights into the efficacy of European engagements on waste
trade, indicating that there is no simple answer as to its effect.
Keywords: Hazardous waste, waste haven effect, international trade,
international environmental agreements, difference-in-differences,
log-linear and ppml gravity model.
JEL codes: F13, F18, Q53, Q56, Q58
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1 Introduction
The relationship between trade and environment has raised a great deal of interest among
economists, despite the fact that simultaneity of the two poses serious empirical challenges,
because when trade increases the environmental damage tends to increase as well. Addi-
tionally, even if the simultaneity issue is addressed, whether trade has a positive or negative
impact on the environment has not emerged consensual answer yet.
A first theoretical puzzle is to assess the environmental impact of trade. Such impact can be
decomposed into three main components: the scale effect, due to the increasing magnitude
of trade, the technique effect, i.e. the impact that new technologies may have on pollution
intensity, and the composition effect, caused by a change in the type of production in place
(Grossman and Krueger [1991]). This paper focuses on the latter effect, by controlling
for scale and technique effect. Following Copeland and Taylor [2003], the composition
effect is broken down into its two driving forces: factor of endowments and environmental
regulation differences.
The second puzzle is the challenge that estimating this effect empirically can represent.
In general, empirical research concentrates in cross-sectional studies, observing environ-
mental impact of trade through emissions as in Cole and Elliott [2003] Frankel and Rose
[2005], Managi et al. [2009] and Baghdadi et al. [2013] or industry location as channel of
attraction of possible pollution haven effect (?, Dean et al. [2009]). The literature is much
less extensive when it comes to estimate the hazardous waste trade, despite the natural
intuition that some negative effect is likely to be found. Exporting hazardous waste to
countries with lenient environmental regulation saves the cost from industry relocation,
Jug and Mirza [2005] support the fact that environmental regulation has an impact in
trade flows. From a policy point of view, this is unfortunate, because waste trade harms
the country environmental quality, not even leaving much of an investment, as is the case
of the pollution haven effect.
According to Misra and Pandey [2005] hazardous waste, when mishandling in any envi-
ronmental media may have both short- and long-term effects on both human and environ-
mental systems. Improper treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste can result
in contaminant during possible exposures, and potential adverse health and environmental
impacts. In the case of this study, even if the flow of hazardous waste shipped from de-
veloped to developing countries represents less then 3% of total trade, irresponsible waste
management practices can create hazardous conditions and considerable risks to human
health. In general, any toxic component can cause severe health consequences, even death
if taken by humans in sufficiently large amounts.
Moreover, there are some products considered in the Basel Convention that are of primary
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concern because even in small doses, can cause adverse health impacts. Some anecdotal
evidence show that irresponsible management of heavy metals included in some devises as
in this analyses ”Waste and scrap of primary cells, primary batteries and electric articles”
are highly toxic even in low doses, specially to those repeatedly exposed to them. Those
substances can have effects to the nervous systems, kidneys and other organs. The effects
of particular concern are those from lead and mercury on the development of the nervous
system in children, other chemicals including some brominated flame retardants can build
up in human bodies from repeated exposures and for some there is evidence of long term
effects including brain development and the whole immune system, many chemicals in
electronic devises are also environmental persistent.1 There are illegal and legal waste
shipments (Bernard [2011]), in the framework of this study due to data-availability only
legal shipments are studied.
Among the studies that directly address waste trade, several are based on cross-sectional
data and treat the phenomenon as a pollution haven effect, either including capital abun-
dance (Baggs [2009]), or including the analysis of environmental regulation differences be-
tween countries (Kellenberg [2012]), also these two papers concentrate in all waste and not
only hazardous waste. In order to control for endogenous simultaneity between trade and
environment, panel-data offer a better setting; this is in line with Kellenberg and Levin-
son [2014], although their analysis is not extensive in terms of disentangling the groups of
countries or regions being more (or less) affected by this trade, and the composition ef-
fect, including the differences in environmental regulation between countries, is not directly
investigated.
This article is most closely related to Kellenberg [2012]. Kellenberg [2012] uses cross-
sectional data-set from the 2003-2004 and also directly asses the environmental regulation
difference issue. He uses the Global Competitiveness Report, as a proxy of the environ-
mental regulation, this index is based on a report having answers of company executives
ranking the enforcement of environmental regulations at country-level. The findings of this
paper are that environmental regulation across countries are an important determinant of
waste trade in developing countries.
This analysis differs from Kellenberg [2012] in several respects, some are methodological
and other are conceptual, but all of them make more accurate results for policy recommen-
dation.
First, in the methodological part the contribution is that this analysis uses panel data-set
in order to disentangle the possible simultaneity of the formalisation, which could be a
result of countries selecting themselves into the formalisation depending on their volume of
waste trade (Baier and Bergstrand [2007]). Also, the environmental regulation index used
1http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/poisoning-the-poor-electroni/
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is a composite index, this index has multiple dimensions in order to asses different features
of the environmental regulation (Brunel and Levinson [2013]). It contains information
about three complementary indicators as in ?, but in this case, those that are relevant
for waste trade are taken. The advantage of using such index is that it captures the
solidity of institutions, the actual state of the environmental outcome and the presence of
environmental trade barriers. Relevance of institutions to trade has been proven important
in Rodriguez and Rodrik [2001] and to pollution in Barrett and Graddy [2000] and in
Candau and Dienesch [2015], this is the first study to include institution quality in waste
trade analysis. These contributions are discussed in detail in the methodology and results
sections.
Second, in the conceptual differences, here only hazardous waste are analyzed due to their
polluting potential, and also because non-hazardous waste can also be recycled and used as
raw materials. The work of Kellenberg and Levinson [2014] is also on a panel data frame-
work but works with all types of waste, and uses only two groups of countries developed
and developing. In this work goes one step forward and explore the waste haven effect both
in the less developed EU countries and in developing countries; this separation on different
country-group, allows to give more precise conclusions on the determinants in force when
waste trade is studied. Finally, developing countries are also separated into regions to see
closer the effect in each region.2
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the international
context on waste trade and some stylized facts. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy.
The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 International context on waste
In the late eighties, claims made by developing countries attracted the attention of the
International community. Those complaints were mainly addressed by African developing
countries, claiming that waste was being illegally disposed in their territories. Their efforts
resulted in the Basel Convention on waste trade, which entered into force in 1992. In its
early days, the instrument implemented by the convention was the Prior Informed Consent
(PIC), a formal mechanism allowing a country to send waste shipments to another country,
conditional on the ’prior consent’ of the corresponding importing authority.
Some years later, developing countries claimed that waste trade had in fact increased
over time (Kellenberg [2012]). This situation lead to the implementation of the Basel
Ban Amendment in 1995. The Ban Amendment is intended to clearly prohibit shipments
2For a list of countries by region refer to the Appendix section A6.
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of hazardous waste from developed to developing countries. Yet, because of the lack of
sufficient ratifying members, such instrument is still not in force. The effect of these
two instruments, in case of the Basel Convention, have shown no effect (Kellenberg and
Levinson [2014]).
However, all the European Union (EU) members signed the Basel Convention and com-
mitted to the Ban Amendment. To formalise this commitment, it had then to be written
in the official journal of the EU, whence an EU regulation on shipments of waste was cre-
ated (EU-WSR).3 The formalisation of the Basel Convention in the EU passed in 2006
and it entered into force in 2007. It includes the Ban Amendment, despite the fact that
the latter is not in force up to date. Even if European countries were to engage into not
sending hazardous waste to developing countries, no legal binding procedure nor enforcing
authority exist to settle potential cases of no compliance.
Being restricted to send waste to developing countries, the former and richer EU countries
(the EU-154) could be tempted to change their waste trading partners to their neighbors,
the new arrived and specially less developed countries (EU-105), which also have laxer
environmental regulations (See Figure 1).
2.1 Stylized facts
To see if increased trade was due to EU-WSR, I estimate first a simple difference-in-
difference regression; results are shown in Table 4 and 5 in appendix. The difference-in-
difference estimation is not appropriate to disentangle the effect of environmental regulation
as a determinant of waste trade. In order to include differences in environmental regulation
and to control for time variant and invariant determinants of trade, these estimations are
set up in a gravity model. Nevertheless, is interesting to have a first glance of the effect
of this formalisation, the magnitude of the trade in each group of country and also how
results change once adding all the controls.
Table 4 shows EU-10 waste imports coming from the EU-15 before and after the EU-WSR;
this is the treatment group. As control group, the waste exports of the EU-15 to three
groups of countries are considered: all countries of the world except the EU-10, the OECD
non-EU and developing or non-OECD countries. Results vary in magnitude depending on
3Council Regulation. No 1013/2006 of European parliament and of the council of 14 June 2006 on
shipments of waste. It will be in force from, 12:1-98, 2007.
4EU-15=Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Suede, United Kingdom
5EU-10=Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Poland. Bulgaria
and Romania not yet obliged to follow this regulation
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the group, but in all cases there is an increase in trade, although results are not significant
in the difference-in-differences estimator.
In the regional analysis, the treatment groups are the African, Asian and American devel-
oping countries whose waste imports are coming from the EU. As control groups, I consider
their imports coming from non-EU OECD countries. All of them are studied before and
after EU-WSR. Table 5 shows the results. A decrease in waste trade is observed in the
African and American regions, although the results lose significance in the difference-in-
differences estimator. In the case of Asia, the waste trade increases, but results are not
significant.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Data
The key point in evaluating the effectiveness of the EU-WSR is to correctly define hazardous
waste. To select the appropriate products, I referred to the definition of hazardous waste
contained in the text of the Basel Convention ”A substance in order to be defined as
hazardous waste, it must both be listed and possess a characteristic such as being explosive,
flammable, toxic, or corrosive. Also, a product could enter in this category if it is defined
as or considered to be a hazardous waste under the laws of either the exporting country,
the importing country, or any of the countries of transit”.6
The data-set used here is a matching process of these two sources of information: the
COMTRADE data-set and the Basel Convention data-set, in time period 2003-2010. Due
to the PIC the Basel Convention has information about the shipments of waste of countries
reported to the importing authority, with the 6-digit HS codes a matching process was done
of the shipments in the Basel Convention registers and the COMTRADE data-set. The
advantage of such combination is that the number of observations is almost doubled, taking
into account possibly mislabeling or irregular shipments.
The type of products selected are those that have disposable waste in their description
and/or in their name. Such definition includes industrial waste, municipal waste, waste
oils, pharmaceutical waste, organic solvents waste, hydraulic fluids waste, brake fluids
and anti freeze fluids waste, chemical products waste, primary cells waste, metal scrap,
primary batteries and electric articles waste. For a full list of the products with their
6-digit harmonized system (HS) codes, refer to Table 6 in the appendix.
6This study concentrates only on hazardous waste, the broader definition of waste includes also non
hazardous waste which could be recycled and hence become raw material or input of production.
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3.2 Variables
As explanatory variables, in order to represent the period (post)t after the EU-WSR and
the country-group, a set of dummies is used. The country-groups are listed in Table 1.
Moreover, following Kellenberg [2012], a measure of differences in costs is also constructed
it helps to control for a matter of specialisation in some countries, due differences in costs
rather than in environmental regulation within countries.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
UE15i 48048 .1794872 .3837637 0 1
UE10i 48048 .1153846 .3194889 0 1
UE15j 48048 .1794872 .3837637 0 1
UE10j 48048 .1153846 .3194889 0 1
africa i 48048 .1282051 .3343216 0 1
asia i 48048 .1923077 .3941176 0 1
america i 48048 .2820513 .4500029 0 1
africa j 48048 .1282051 .3343216 0 1
asia j 48048 .1923077 .3941176 0 1
america j 48048 .2820513 .4500029 0 1
OCDE 48048 .4230769 .4940525 0 1
OCDEP 48048 .4230769 .4940525 0 1
oecdnoneu i 48048 .1666667 .3726819 0 1
oecdnoeu j 48048 .1666667 .3726819 0 1
Table 1: Explained and explanatory variables
The dependent variable is the aggregated waste trade. It has been constructed using total
weight imported, aggregated from the 6-digit HS, for the specific products that are subject
to the definition of waste mentioned above. Those countries that do not trade certain
products for the entire period under study are excluded from the main analysis. Even
then, the quantity of zeros in the dependent variable is important.
Imports weight rather than value is used because it makes more sense from an environ-
mental point of view (Kellenberg [2012]) and because, waste being not a regular product,
the direction of the payment is not well established. Inside the products considered, there
could be some of them that are exported to extract some material e.g. electronic devises,
others could be exported just to disposal at lower costs either labor costs or environmental
costs, for this reason there is not clear way to know if the value is the payment of importer
country or exporter country.
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3.3 Environmental regulation gradient
Studying hazardous waste imports derives its relevance from the polluting potential of
such products. This is particularly true in developing countries, since countries who do not
possess the installed capacity of producing products which ensue those waste products or
by-products, improbably could manage their treatment or disposal in an environmentally
friendly way (Briggs [2003]).7 If a phenomenon of specialisation is emerging, it should be
captured by the costs gradient.
Furthermore, if a waste haven effect exists, developing countries environment and health
outcomes could be affected not only by lax environmental regulations in loco, but also by
stricter environmental regulations with trading partner countries. Measuring the difference
in environmental regulation between countries helps identifying this channel, specifically in
the case of waste imports, that cannot be considered as an importing ”good”, but rather
as an environment-harming ”bad”.
0 5 10 15
OthersNon-EU OECD
EU 15EU 10
AsiaAmerica
Africa
before and after 2007
by group of countries
Environmental regulation
before after
0 20 40 60
OthersNon-EU OECD
EU 15EU 10
AsiaAmerica
Africa
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0 20 40 60 80
OthersNon-EU OECD
EU 15EU 10
AsiaAmerica
Africa
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by group of countries
Environmental quality
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0 20 40 60 80 100
OthersNon-EU OECD
EU 15EU 10
AsiaAmerica
Africa
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by group of countries
Environmental trade barriers
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Figure 1: Environmental regulation components
The claims made by developing countries about the increased imports of hazardous waste
after the enforcement of the Basel Convention pointed to the fact that institutions could
7”Scope of the Chemicals and Waste Subprogramme” (UNEP and Harmful Sub-
stances at a glance Division of Technology, Industry and Economics United Na-
tions Environment Programme (UNEP) International Environment House. June 2010),
http://www.unep.org/chemicalsandwaste/About/tabid/258/Default.aspx.
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be corrupted. This fact could have lead to increased waste imports or maintained trends
in this trade, as underlined by Kellenberg and Levinson [2014].
According to Ben Kheder and Zugravu [2012] and Brunel and Levinson [2013] a composed
index of environmental regulation is necessary to measure the multidimensional features of
the matter and to capture fundamental aspects such as the institutional efficiency, environ-
mental outcomes and environmental trade barriers. The environmental regulation variable
is estimated as an aggregated variable composed of these three indexes; estimations of
these three complementary variables are also conducted in a disaggregated form in order
to account for their individual effect. Further explanation about each variable is to be
found in the appendix.
The environmental regulation gradient (ERG) ERGijt = (Ejt − Eit)/[(Ejt + Eit)/2] that
captures the differences between countries, is constructed following Kellenberg [2012]. The
gradient will increase as the differences in environmental regulation within a couple of
countries trading waste increases, either because one country makes his regulation stricter
or because the other makes it looser. The construction of the environmental regulation gra-
dient, the normalisation of the three proxy variables and the estimation of the aggregated
gradient are detailed in the Appendix A5 .
3.4 Model specification
In 2006, the EU parliament approved a regulation intended to ban shipments of hazardous
waste to developing countries EU-WSR. This regulation is a formalisation of the Basel
Convention and of its related Ban Amendment on hazardous waste. Using this information,
I construct an indicator variable for bilateral trading pairs where exporting countries are
the EU-15 and importing countries are EU-10; this dummy variable is coupled with a
period variable, which distinguishes periods before and after 2007, the year in which the
regulation entered into force. Finally, the interaction between these two variables and the
ERG is considered.
To this difference-in-differences specification is joined gravity model of trade as the workhorse
in estimating the effect of policy-based bilateral agreements on bilateral trade flows (Head
and Mayer [2014]) and following the most recent developments of the gravity specification
(Baier and Bergstrand [2007], Santos Silva [2011]).
An important issue in the estimation of the effects of a policy aimed at changing trade
patterns is that potential self-selection of country pairs into more or less trading of the
targeted products generates endogeneity bias in the estimates.
9
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.47
In order to deal with this several techniques are adopted; first, to avoid endogeneity bias
by incorporating bilateral effects in a log-levels specification, panel data-set methods are
used. Second, multilateral resistant factors (MRF), which represent relative-price differ-
ences across countries with respect to all their trading partners, are included in the model
(Anderson and Van Wincoop [2004]). In a panel data-set framework, since these factors
vary over time, they are proxied using time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects,
which will capture not only price effects, but also all the unobservable heterogeneity that
varies over time for each origin and for each destination. Furthermore, bilateral fixed effects
are used to control for time invariant determinants.
One of the main challenges to face when working with empirical trade models is that in esti-
mating a gravity model, the dependent variable often takes the value of zero, which creates
problems of convergence in the model. This is especially true with trade in products such
as hazardous waste. In order to deal with this drawback, the model is first estimated esti-
mated in a log-linear form; such procedure does not account for the zeros in the dependent
variable, because of convergence problems. Nevertheless, to test the robustness of results
and deal with the convergence issue, a pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood (ppml) model
(Santos Silva [2011]) is used under different subsets of fixed effects. Further explanation is
in robustness subsection.
The empirical form of the gravity model of trade adopted here is due to Anderson and Van
Wincoop [2004]; it has a log-linear form given by:
lnMijt = lnYit + lnYjt − lnY Wt + (1 − σ)lntijt − (1 − σ)lnPit − (1 − σ)lnPjt (1)
where lnMijt denotes imports of country i coming form countries j in year t.
8 lnYit,
lnYjt and lnY
W
t represent GDP of country i, GDP of country j and GDP of the world,
respectively. lntijt, lnPit and lnPjt stand for the so-called MRF and σ is the elasticity of
substitution of all goods.
In order to combine the policy impact analysis to the gravity one, Equation 2, rejoins the
difference-in-differences estimation and the gravity model. To control for the MRF, a set
of θ dummy variables is added to the empirical specification of equation 1.
lnMijt = β0 + β1(ERG)ijt + β2(post)t + β3(treat)ij + β4(post ∗ treat)ijt+
8Imports are used instead of exports, because they are known in the trade literature for being more
reliable.
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β5(ERG ∗ post)ijt + β6(ERG ∗ treat)ijt + β7(ERG ∗ post ∗ treat)ijt+
β8Costgradijt + θ1it + θ2jt + θ3FEij + θ4t + µijt (2)
here, the dependent variable lnM represents the imports of waste in logs, (ERG) is the
environmental regulation gradient, (post) the period after the EU-WSR and (treatgroup)
the country-group. Additionally, the model contains the interactions of the three variables
(ERG∗post∗ treat) and a cost gradient (Costgrad). The remaining variables are country-
time, time dummy variables, bilateral fixed effects, and an idiosyncratic error term. The
coefficient of interest is β7, which represents the effect of the EU-WSR in the specific
country-group while taking into account the differences in environmental regulation.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
Estimation results for the flow of imports of the 10 EU countries from the 15 called
EU-10 15 are presented in Table 2. The control country-groups are: the world, the OECD
non-EU and the non-OECD countries. The second one would be the best candidate as con-
trol group.9 A cost gradient is used to control for cost differences; the elasticity associated
to the latter variable is almost systematically not significant.
The variable, representing the interaction between the difference-in-differences estimator
and the environmental regulation, is not significant in its aggregated form, suggesting
that for the EU-10 after 2007 the environmental regulation differences did not have an
increasing impact on waste imports. Nevertheless, the total effect of the variable of period
(ERG ∗ post)ijt is negative and significant, suggesting a decrease in waste trade due to
environmental regulation differences, that however has not been greater in magnitude than
for other OECD non-EU countries.
Decomposing the ERG variable in its three complementary elements, it is observed as a
partial effect that environmental trade barriers are positive and significant in all three
groups. This suggests that international environmental agreements do not have the effect
of stopping trade, but rather of increasing it, or at least of increasing the transparency in
shipments records, a fact that was already underlined in the literature on waste trade. This
9Ideally, the best control group would be represented by the OECD non-EU countries that are the
least developed or similarly developed as the EU-10. But the available data about waste shipments is not
sufficient to conduct the estimation and aggravates the zero problem in the dependent variable.
11
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is true not only for the EU-10 but for all countries considered, this rise the question if that
could be the driving variable of the effect in the aggregated analysis of the ERG.
The environmental performance gradient in the world control group and in the OECD
NON-EU has negative and significant effect, suggesting a decrease on trade when the EU-
15 increase their environmental performance, probably stricter standards also impede waste
to leave the country in this case. Complete results are reported in the Appendix.
OLS EU 10-15
AGGREGATED ERG
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES CG: WORLD OECD NON-EU Developing NON OECD
post 141.9 70.88* 16.19
(159.3) (37.40) (23.53)
Environmental reg. gradient x post -646.1 -3,777** -239.9
(583.8) (1,690) (629.8)
Partial effect Environmental reg. gradient x post 0,0 -3,77 0,0
OLS EU 10-15
DISAGGREGATED ERG
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES CG: THE WORLD OECD NON-EU Developing NON OECD
Env. performance gradient x 10-15 4.891** 5.168 -4.550
(2.453) (3.222) (3.829)
Env. perf. grdt. x post x 10-15 -7.402*** -6.109* -4.787
(2.614) (3.672) (4.906)
Env. trade barriers gradient x post 28.49** 37.92** 27.80**
(12.80) (17.02) (13.75)
Partial effect Env. performance gradient x 10-15 4,891 0 0
Partial effect Institution efficiency 0 0 0
Partial effect Env. trade barriers gradient x post 28,29 37,92 27,8
Total effect environmental performance gradient -7,402 -6,109 0
Observations 4,045 1,255 2,451
Number of ij 787 230 543
Time dummy YES YES YES
Country and time dummies YES YES YES
Bilateral FE YES YES YES
Dependent variable ln Imports ln Imports ln Imports
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Effect of EU-WSR on the EU-10
Next, regarding the regional analysis. The treatment groups are the flow of imports from
African, Asian and American developing countries coming from the EU, and the control
groups are flow of imports of the same regions from OECD non-EU countries. Results are
displayed in Table 3. There is no global effect, particularly in the aggregated form of the
environmental regulation gradient.
12
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In the disaggregated form of the ERG, no effect of the interaction term of the difference-
in-differences estimator and the ERG is found in African or Asia region, but there is an
increasing effect in the American region. This results challenge the efficacy of the EU-WSR,
the partial effects are hard to generalize. Those results are valid for the specific region and
period, but not distinguishing from the EU and the OECD non-EU countries as exporter
countries. Full tables of results are presented in the Appendix.
4.2 Robustness
As robustness, first it was estimated the same model using different specifications of ppml
models, so as to mitigate the zero problem in the dependent variable. Second, applying the
same model to the BACI data-set (Gaulier and Zignago [2010]) to see if the results found
are not driven by our data-set.10
For the ppml model, some convergence problems emerged. To face them, different sets of
fixed effects and dummy variables were used in order the model to converge. In the case of
EU-10 imports, setting the OECD non-EU countries as control group,11 a decrease of waste
trade is perceived as a result of environmental regulation differences. The β7 coefficient is
negative and significant in the aggregated form of the ERG and in two of the variables in
the disaggregated approach, the environmental performance and the environmental trade
barriers, but is positive and significant for the Institution efficiency gradient. We cannot
call for a waste haven effect because some decreased trade is observed, but nevertheless,
decreasing Institution efficiency in the EU-10 countries vis-a-vis their EU-15 can be a
possible channel for increased waste imports and to call for a waste haven effect. These
results highlight the drawback of the log-linear form in gravity models, that cannot account
zero values in the dependent variable, but also raise another question that is interesting
that is the difference between the OLS model and the ppml model that in the first we can
take into account the quantity of flow of imports and in the second one the decision to
import or not plus the quantity traded.
In the case of the regional analysis, the ppml model could only converge for Africa, but
without any total effect of environmental regulation in the aggregate form, but a negative
significant effect for differences in environmental performances, nevertheless this result is
without country-time dummies. For the other two regions Asia there is no effect in the case
of the aggregated form of the environmental regulation variable and an increasing waste
imports in the disaggregated form due to environmental trade barriers differences. In the
case of America region, there is a decreasing effect in the aggregated and disaggregated form
10BACI data-set is the World trade database developed by the CEPII at a high level of product disag-
gregation. http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/fr/bddmodele/presentation.asp?id = 1
11This control group was the only one that converged with country-time dummies and fixed-effects.
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OLS Developing-EU
AGGREGATED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION PROXY
VARIABLES Africa-EU Asia-EU America-EU
Africa/Asia/America - EU dummy -401.7** 0 -87.14**
(200.1) (204.2) (43.69)
Environmental reg. gradient 3,536** 1,081 788.2**
(1,742) (1,323) (397.2)
post x Af/As/Am - EU 327.6* 159.9 72.16*
(198.4) (200.2) (38.14)
Environmental reg. gradient x Af/As/Am - EU 3.773 -3.287 -4.810*
(9.260) (2.966) (2.734)
GDP/capita gradient 3.105 -2.212*** 0.548
(5.039) (0.808) (1.838)
Partial effect of Africa/Asia/America - EU dummy -401,7 -167,2 -87,14
Partial effect of environmental reg. gradient 3,536 0 788,2
Partial effect of post x Af/As/Am - EU 327,6 0 72,16
Partial effect of environmental reg. gradient x Af/As/Am - EU 0 0 -4,81
OLS Developing-EU
DISAGGREGATED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION PROXY
VARIABLES Africa-EU Asia-EU America-EU
post 15.23 -55.31*** 3.514
(34.08) (16.35) (25.26)
Af/As/Am dummy -19.74** -26.94*** 19.08*
(9.936) (8.928) (9.751)
Env. performance gradient 16.11*** -3.548** 14.51
(4.758) (1.484) (18.26)
Env. performance gradient x post -13.71** 2.657 18.91
(5.922) (1.765) (19.01)
Institution efficiency gradient x post -7.985 -25.56** 9.374
(17.07) (10.25) (10.54)
Env. trade barriers gradient -43.43*** 18.17** -6.334
(13.24) (7.114) (8.494)
Env. trade barriers gradient x post 48.76** -20.01* -15.55
(23.81) (11.26) (10.96)
Env. trade barriers grdt. x post x Af/As/Am 0.509 0.925 4.514***
(3.196) (1.691) (1.720)
GDP/capita gradient 4.633 -1.013 0.286
(4.891) (0.848) (2.067)
Total effect Env. trade barriers 0 0 4,514
Observations 593 1,847 1,165
Number of ij 164 348 316
Time dummy YES YES YES
Country and time dummies YES YES YES
Bilateral FE YES YES YES
Dependent variable ln Imports ln Imports ln Imports
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Impact of EU-WSR on developing countries
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of the environmental regulation, in the disaggregated due to environmental performance
differences. Nevertheless, there no country-time dummies were used due to convergence
problems, so these two last results are to be taken cautiously. Summary of the results
are displayed in Table A14 Table:16 in the Appendix, while full results are available upon
request.
Replicating the same estimations with the BACI data-set, it is observed that BACI data-
set has much less observations then the data-set used in the benchmark model, which
is a matching of the World trade data-set and the Basel Convention records. In the
case of EU-10 15 it is observed a decrease of waste imports, which is also confirm in the
disaggregated analysis, due to institution efficiency differences and environmental trade
barriers. The drawback is that these results cannot be separated from EU or OECD non-
EU countries.
For the regional analysis however what attracts the attention, is the result for Africa region
with an increase of waste trade in the aggregated form of the variable, nevertheless results
are not maintained with the disaggregated analysis of the ERG, with the BACI data-set.
These contradictory results could be due to a mismatch between information reported by
countries to the Basel Convention and to the world trade organisation. Main results are
in A14 Table:14 in the Appendix.12
The consideration of all models estimated suggests that we cannot call for a Waste Haven
Effect for the less developed countries of the EU, nevertheless, when we take into account
the decision of importing or not waste and the quantity imported we observe that increasing
differences of those countries with respect with the more developed countries of the EU
increases imports of waste after the EU-WSR. In the case of developing countries analyzed
by regions there is no evidence to call for the efficacy of the EU-WSR which is in line with
the literature Kellenberg [2012].
5 Conclusions
Differences in environmental regulation can be drivers for transboundary movements of
pollutants, in this paper its showed robust evidence about decreasing flows of waste in the
less developed countries of the EU, as a consequence of the EU-WSR. Nevertheless, these
results also highlight that there is an increased flow of waste when analysing institution
efficiency differences.
Results contribute to the literature by providing evidence in a more precise way about haz-
12Full results are available upon request.
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ardous waste trade. The effect of the European engagements as with the EU-WSR could be
positive for the EU zone, but there is no effect for developing countries. And including also
the EU-10 as the receivers of hazardous waste, besides the so-called developing countries,
as previews works pointed out.
Additionally, showing that using a disaggregated form of the ERG helps studying the
different features of the ERG in a more detailed manner. Similarly, the regional sep-
aration contributes to observe differences in waste imports across groups of developing
countries.
The aftermath is that differences in environmental regulations are not only a concern for
developing countries, but to all countries exposed to a gap in regulation with regard to the
trading partners. Nevertheless, results conduct to believe that reinforced institutions are
likely to be effective in inverting this trend.
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Appendix
A1
EU-10 WASTE IMPORTS
THE NEW EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS TREATMENT GROUP
BASEL CONVENTION FORMALISATION
CONTROL GROUP THE WORLD
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 8624
Baseline Follow-up
Control: 3808 3808 7616
Treated: 504 504 1008
4312 4312 8624
R-square: 0.0013
DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION
BASE LINE FOLLOW UP
Outcome Variable Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF
Imports 5 700 000 240 000 -5 500 000 6 000 000 850 000 -5 100 000 390 000
P>t 0.000 0.908 0.013** 0.000 0.683 0.021** 0.901
CONTROL GROUP OECD NON-EU
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 18200
Baseline Follow-up
Control: 8596 8596 17192
Treated: 504 504 1008
9100 9100 18200
R-square: 0.0003
DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION
BASE LINE FOLLOW UP
Outcome Variable Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF
Imports 3 000 000 240 000 -2 700 000 3 300 000 850 000 -2 400 000 300 000
P>t 0.000 0.871 0.073* 0.000 0.565 0.111 0.888
CONTROL GROUP NON OECD
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 37856
Baseline Follow-up
Control: 18424 18424 36848
Treated: 504 504 1008
18928 18928 37856
R-square: 0.0001
DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION
BASE LINE FOLLOW UP
Outcome Variable Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF
Imports 2 200 000 240 000 -1 900 000 23 000 000 850 000 -1 500 000 470 000
P>t 0.000 0.880 0.231 0.000 0.592 0.366 0.836
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Imports of EU-10 Difference-in-difference estimation.
19
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.47
A2
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES REGIONAL EFFECTS
TREATMENT GROUP AFRICA
BASEL CONVENTION FORMALISATION
CONTROL GROUP AFRICAN IMPORTS FROM NON EUROPEAN OECD COUNTRIES
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 23848
Baseline Follow-up
Control: 10964 10964 21928
Treated: 960 960 1920
11924 11924 23848
R-square: 0.0005
DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION
BASE LINE FOLLOW UP
Outcome Variable Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF
Imports 3 600 000 59 000 -3 500 000 3 900 000 120 000 -3 700 000 -230 000
P>t 0.000 0.967 0.019** 0.000 0.935 0.013** 0.915
TREATMENT GROUP ASIA
BASEL CONVENTION FORMALISATION
CONTROL GROUP AFRICAN IMPORTS FROM NON EUROPEAN OECD COUNTRIES
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 25640
Baseline Follow-up
Control: 11380 11380 22760
Treated: 1440 1440 2880
12820 12820 25640
R-square: 0.0001
DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION
BASE LINE FOLLOW UP
Outcome Variable Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF
Imports 3 200 000 3 000 000 -290 000 3 400 000 5 300 000 1 900 000 2 200 000
P>t 0.000 0.010 0.813 0.000 0.000 0.123 0.209
TREATMENT GROUP AMERICA
BASEL CONVENTION FORMALISATION
CONTROL GROUP AFRICAN IMPORTS FROM NON EUROPEAN OECD COUNTRIES
Number of observations in the DIFF-IN-DIFF: 28104
Baseline Follow-up
Control: 11940 11940 23880
Treated: 2112 2112 4224
14052 14052 28104
R-square: 0.0001
DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION
BASE LINE FOLLOW UP
Outcome Variable Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-IN-DIFF
Imports 3 300 000 61 000 -3 200 000 3 500 000 39 000 -3 500 000 -270 000
P>t 0.000 0.880 0.001*** 0.000 0.965 0.000*** 0.846
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Imports of Developing countries by region Difference-in-difference estimation.
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A3
Codes HS6 of products considered as waste
251720 Macadam of slag/dross/similar industrial waste.
262110 Ash & residues from the incineration of municipal waste
271091 Waste oils containing polychlorinated biphenyls, terphenyls, biphenyls.
271099 Waste oils other than those containing polychlorinated biphenyls, terphenyls, biphenyls.
300680 Waste pharmaceuticals
300692 Waste pharmaceuticals
382510 Municipal waste
382530 Clinical waste
382541 Halogenated waste organic solvents
382549 Waste organic solvents other than halogenated waste organic solvents
382550 Waste of metal pickling liquors, hydraulic fluids, brake fluids & anti-freeze fluids
382561 Miscellaneous chemical products, mainly containing organic constituents
382569 Miscellaneous chemical products, allied industries, n.e.s. In Ch 38
382590 Residual products of the chem/allied industries, n.e.s. In Ch 38
391530 Waste, parings and scrap, of polymers of vinyl chloride
711230 Waste and scrap of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal
740400 Copper waste and scrap
780200 Lead waste and scrap
790200 Zinc waste and scrap
810730 Cadmium waste and scrap
811020 Antimony waste and scrap
811213 Beryllium waste and scrap
811222 Chromium waste and scrap
854810 Waste and scrap of primary cells, primary batteries and electric art.
Table 6: Hazardous waste products with HS6 codes.
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A4
Environmental Performance Index
Environmental Trade Barriers:
Source: InforMEA: United Nations
Dummy of ratification of:
Basel : Waste including hazardous waste
Rotterdam : Hazardous chemicals
Stockholm : Persistent Organic Pollutants
Institution Efficiency:
Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicators project
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption
Environmental Quality:
Source: Environmental Performance Index: Yale University
Environmental burden of disease, Air pollution and Water
Biodiversity, Habitat, Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, Climate Change
Table 7: Environmental regulation components
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A5
Environmental regulation gradient
The environmental regulation gradient was constructed inspired by Ben Kheder and Zu-
gravu [2012]. Only that in this case were chosen other complementary proxies of environ-
mental regulation, because those are more suitable to study trade on waste. The proxies
are: environmental trade barriers, institution efficiency and environmental quality.
Environmental trade barriers
Environmental trade barriers proxy is composed of treaties ratified by countries. This
variable captures the ease of a country to trade dangerous substances. In this case not all
ratification of treaties are used, in order to be more specific, only ratification of treaties
that could affect trade in waste are taken into account.
The treaties are Basel convention (on waste and hazardous waste), Stockholm convention
(on persistent organic pollutants) and Rotterdam convention (on hazardous chemicals).
The information about the members, by convention, can be found in the United Nations
platform InforMEA.13
Institution efficiency
Institution efficiency proxy is a variable that captures the institutional solidity of a country.
Four variables about institutional efficiency are used to construct this variable: government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.
Those variables are corruption perception indexes and were chosen from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators project.14
Environmental quality
Environmental quality proxy is the variable that measures the actual outcomes of the
environment, at a country-level.
This variable ranks countries’ performance on environmental issues having two scopes: pro-
tection of human health and protection of ecosystems.15
13http://www.informea.org/fr
14http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspxhome
15http://epi.yale.edu/
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The time dimension is also taken into account in the three variables. First step, is the
aggregation of the components of each variable, this is done as Ben Kheder and Zugravu
[2012], doing an average of the variables. Second step, is the normalisation of these three
variables. Once they are normalised, it is possible to construct the gradient according to
Kellenberg [2012].
For the aggregated index, a regression of the log of waste imports is estimated. Using as
explanatory variables, all the components of the three proxies. First, for country i and
then for country j.
Then the predicted values Yˆit and Yˆjt are extracted, this procedure allows to have the
part of waste trade that could have been explained by environmental regulation reasons.
Then these values are used to construct the gradient. Analogously, as in the case of the
disaggregated index, the time dimension is also taken into account, as data-set in a dynamic
panel.
ERGijt = (Yˆjt − Yˆit)/[(Yˆjt + Yˆit)/2]
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A6
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Africa America Asia
Egypt Argentina Bangladesh
Kenya Bolivia China
Morocco Brazil India
Mozambique Colombia Indonesia
Nigeria Costa Rica Jordan
Senegal Dominican Republic Malaysia
South Africa Ecuador Pakistan
Tunisia El Salvador Philippines
Zambia Guatemala Singapore
Zimbabwe Honduras Sri Lanka
Jamaica Thailand
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Table 8: Countries by region
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A7
OLS EU 10-15
AGGREGATED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION PROXY
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES CG: WORLD OECD NON-EU Developing NON OECD
post 141.9 70.88* 16.19
(159.3) (37.40) (23.53)
10-15 dummy -3.054 36.13 24.21
(13.45) (191.3) (116.3)
Environmental reg. gradient 78.64 193.8 54.97
(433.2) (1,368) (482.4)
post x 10-15 -141.0 -486.8 -81.26
(114.6) (450.9) (192.4)
Environmental reg. gradient x post -646.1 -3,777** -239.9
(583.8) (1,690) (629.8)
Environmental reg. gradient x 10-15 3.244 6.284 12.18
(7.150) (9.709) (12.54)
Env. reg. grdt. x post x 10-15 0.481 -0.679 10.41
(7.246) (9.612) (17.23)
GDP/capita gradient 1.696 0.833 1.080
(1.388) (5.788) (1.592)
rta 20.32 50.94 16.17
(60.96) (102.4) (67.81)
wto 15.61 39.55 53.27
(67.81) (36.50) (182.9)
Partial effect 0,0 -3,77 0,0
Observations 4,045 1,255 2,451
Number of ij 787 230 543
Time dummy YES YES YES
Country and time dummies YES YES YES
Bilateral FE YES YES YES
Dependent variable ln Imports ln Imports ln Imports
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Full results aggregated
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A8
OLS EU 10-15
DISAGGREGATED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION PROXY
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES CG: THE WORLD OECD NON-EU Developing NON OECD
post -6.330 -133.7 -19.05
(12.14) (82.30) (33.28)
10-15 dummy 6.529 -17.37 15.84**
(18.65) (21.47) (6.727)
post x 10-15 -2.169 46.40 -16.95
(16.38) (46.11) (10.57)
Env. performance gradient -1.656 24.71 -3.330
(2.792) (21.88) (2.928)
Env. performance gradient x 10-15 4.891** 5.168 -4.550
(2.453) (3.222) (3.829)
Env. performance gradient x post 3.322 3.180 3.189
(2.886) (28.57) (3.219)
Env. perf. grdt. x post x 10-15 -7.402*** -6.109* -4.787
(2.614) (3.672) (4.906)
Institution efficiency gradient 2.598 30.76 0.147
(7.202) (67.26) (7.761)
Institution efficiency gradient x 10-15 2.147 2.042 1.405
(2.486) (3.601) (3.335)
Institution efficiency gradient x post -4.930 21.11 -5.637
(7.189) (56.34) (8.315)
Institution efficiency grdt. x post x 10-15 -2.132 -2.867 -1.335
(2.684) (3.642) (4.622)
Env. trade barriers gradient -3.739 -3.028 -5.909
(7.017) (8.770) (7.593)
Env. trade barriers gradient x 10-15 1.252 1.482 -0.598
(1.321) (1.611) (2.314)
Env. trade barriers gradient x post 28.49** 37.92** 27.80**
(12.80) (17.02) (13.75)
Env. trade barriers grdt. x post x 10-15 -3.672 -3.839 -7.000
(3.310) (5.118) (5.855)
GDP/capita gradient 1.732 -0.218 1.503
(1.638) (7.349) (1.844)
rta -3.393 -62.23 24.12
(10.37) (50.62) (35.46)
wto -2.939 -3.319 18.15
(9.551) (6.100) (19.06)
Partial effect Env. performance gradient x 10-15 4,891 0 0
Partial effect Institution efficiency 0 0 0
Partial effect Env. trade barriers gradient x post 28,29 37,92 27,8
Total effect envrionmental performance gradient -7,402 -6,109 0
Observations 4,045 1,255 2,451
Number of ij 787 230 543
Time dummy YES YES YES
Country and time dummies YES YES YES
Bilateral FE YES YES YES
Dependent variable ln Imports ln Imports ln Imports
df m 624 233 464
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: Full results disaggregated
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A9
OLS Developing-EU
AGGREGATED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION PROXY
VARIABLES Africa-EU Asia-EU America-EU
post 61.18 51.72 17.72
(356.6) (65.72) (88.86)
Africa/Asia/America - EU dummy -401.7** -167.2 -87.14**
(200.1) (204.2) (43.69)
Environmental reg. gradient 3,536** 1,081 788.2**
(1,742) (1,323) (397.2)
post x Af/As/Am - EU 327.6* 159.9 72.16*
(198.4) (200.2) (38.14)
Environmental reg. gradient x post -2,644 -984.2 -268.7
(1,787) (1,615) (710.3)
Environmental reg. gradient x Af/As/Am - EU 3.773 -3.287 -4.810*
(9.260) (2.966) (2.734)
Env. reg. grdt. x post x Af/As/Am - EU -3.521 1.722 3.331
(8.519) (3.636) (3.213)
GDP/capita gradient 3.105 -2.212*** 0.548
(5.039) (0.808) (1.838)
rta 0.784 1.245** 0.250
(1.272) (0.596) (0.483)
wto -109.8* -21.24 -37.11**
(56.74) (33.41) (18.89)
Partial effect of Africa/Asia/America - EU dummy -401,7 0 -87,14
Partial effect of environmental reg. gradient 3,536 0 788,2
Partial effect of post x Af/As/Am - EU 327,6 0 72,16
Partial effect of environmental reg. gradient x Af/As/Am - EU 0 0 -4,81
Observations 593 1,847 1,165
Number of ij 164 348 316
Time dummy YES YES YES
Country and time dummies YES YES YES
Bilateral FE YES YES YES
Dependent variable ln Imports ln Imports ln Imports
df m 142 343 306
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Full results aggregated
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A10
OLS Developing-EU
DISAGGREGATED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION PROXY
VARIABLES Africa-EU Asia-EU America-EU
post 15.23 -55.31*** 3.514
(34.08) (16.35) (25.26)
Af/As/Am dummy -19.74** -26.94*** 19.08*
(9.936) (8.928) (9.751)
post x Af/As/Am 21.82* 42.97*** -15.93
(11.76) (12.21) (11.47)
Env. performance gradient 16.11*** -3.548** 14.51
(4.758) (1.484) (18.26)
Env. performance gradient x Af/As/Am -1.840 0.675 -2.665
(1.641) (0.561) (1.637)
Env. performance gradient x post -13.71** 2.657 18.91
(5.922) (1.765) (19.01)
Env. perf. grdt. x post x Af/As/Am 0.422 0.534 -0.932
(1.656) (0.514) (1.806)
Institution efficiency gradient -0.375 -1.364 -5.344
(18.65) (5.551) (9.445)
Institution efficiency gradient x Af/As/Am -3.551 -0.892 -0.0677
(2.378) (0.872) (1.365)
Institution efficiency gradient x post -7.985 -25.56** 9.374
(17.07) (10.25) (10.54)
Institution efficiency grdt. x post x Af/As/Am 3.336 -0.0997 -0.698
(2.159) (1.059) (1.249)
Env. trade barriers gradient -43.43*** 18.17** -6.334
(13.24) (7.114) (8.494)
Env. trade barriers gradient x Af/As/Am -0.357 -0.265 -0.685
(2.839) (1.138) (1.162)
Env. trade barriers gradient x post 48.76** -20.01* -15.55
(23.81) (11.26) (10.96)
Env. trade barriers grdt. x post x Af/As/Am 0.509 0.925 4.514***
(3.196) (1.691) (1.720)
GDP/capita gradient 4.633 -1.013 0.286
(4.891) (0.848) (2.067)
rta 1.107 1.009* 0.691
(1.568) (0.609) (0.743)
wto -16.78** 17.93*** 2.031
(8.412) (5.020) (9.921)
Total effect Env. trade barriers 0 0 4,514
Observations 593 1,847 1,165
Number of ij 164 348 316
Time dummy YES YES YES
Country and time dummies YES YES YES
Bilateral FE YES YES YES
Dependent variable ln Imports ln Imports ln Imports
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Full results disaggregated
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